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Abstract 
 
EPAs between the EU and ACP countries can be viewed as being anti mercantilist and there has 
been a lot of speculations about their outcome. The aim of the study is to determine the effects 
of the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the European Union (EU) and the 
Southern African Customs Union (SACU) members using Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) 
version 7. Two scenarios are analysed: first when the other SACU member states sign the EPAs 
with the EU excluding South Africa and secondly when the entire SACU member states including 
South Africa sign a full EPA with the EU. Results show that South Africa does stand to lose when 
the other member states sign. However, signing of the EPA of the SACU as a bloc, including 
South Africa result in welfare gain in the region. Significantly, there is an increased export of 
livestock and processed foods to the EU from SACU region meaning that the region stands to 
gain in promoting these industries after an EPA. Besides these two sectors, most of the other 
sectors tend to lose out. It should be noted that full benefits of trade liberalisation agreements 
depend on speed of industry reform and therefore can only be realised in the long run. 
 
Introduction 
There has been controversies concerning the accession to the Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPAs) for some member countries of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) 
with the stronger economy i.e. South Africa arguing that signing of the EPAs by members of the 
SACU will result in South African exports losing out to European Union (EU) exports to these 
state which are namely Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho, and Swaziland (BNLS) after an EPA 
agreement with the EU. However, South Africa’s signing of the EPAs may offset this loss by 
increased exports to the EU. This paper aims to analyse these scenarios empirically by use of 
the GTAP model. The paper is arranged as follow: an introduction which gives the background 
of the study and the SACU region, a brief introduction to the GTAP model and data, 
Experimental designs, results, discussion and conclusion. 
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As such, various studies have been undertaken on the economic effects of the EPAs in Southern 
African Development Cooperation (SADC) countries using different approaches and with 
various and mixed outcomes. Milner et al (2007) found that if Mauritius eliminates all tariffs on 
imports from the EU, there will be a small welfare loss unless the potential for production gains 
is included. 
Morrissey and Zgovu (2007) by use of a partial equilibrium analytical framework concluded that 
African Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP) countries should not be excessively concerned about 
the impact of EPAs: even assuming ‘immediate’ complete elimination of all tariffs on agriculture 
imports from the EU, and when excluding up to 20% of imports as sensitive products, over half 
of ACP countries are likely to experience welfare gains with 10 out of 13 Least Developed 
Countries (LDC) gaining and about 60% of non LCD’s suffering welfare loses.  
There has also been uncertainties on whether EPAs will promote regional integration of ACP 
countries as claimed by the EU or subject ACP countries to unfair competition from subsidized 
EU exports, such uncertainties arising due to question like: how much liberalization would each 
ACP country have to undertake to meet the definition of substantially all trade in the EPAs 
clause, how difficult is it likely to be to forge common regional positions under EPAs that do not 
result in future problems and what effect will EPA liberalization have on ACP government 
revenue (Stevens  et al 2005).   
An important contentious issue in the EPAs as far as trade liberalization and reciprocity 
arrangement with the EU is concerned is the heterogeneity of the ACP countries in their trade 
and tariff lines and on their classification of sensitive products. This means that no uniform 
trade agreement can be suitable for all the ACP countries and this is more so in cases of 
regional trading blocs and members of customs unions like the SACU who negotiate these EPAs 
as a unit. These issues makes the arguments proposed by the EU that the EPAs will promote 
regional integration look over ambitious and not easy to model and support empirically. 
In another study by Milner et al (2006) of the effects of the EPAs on East African Cooperation 
(EAC) countries comprising of Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania where Kenya is the dominant 
economy and exports products to Tanzania and Uganda, the effect of the EPAs has been found 
to result in the displacement of Kenyan exports by EU exports with producers losses in Kenya. 
This ‘Kenya effect’ then is identical to the South African situation in the SACU region.  
Another sensitive question is the effects of EPAs on government revenue and the SACU region 
is a good case to study in an attempt to answer this question.  
Revenue implications and which items to liberalize becomes an important issue for members of 
a custom union. Studies by Institute of Development Studies, Sussex (IDS) have found that 
there is no product with a natural overlap among regional blocs meaning negotiations will have 
to be set up by the liberalizing states to come to an agreement on which products to liberalize 
since the countries differ greatly in their trade profile with the EU and will therefore have 
different classification of sensitive products as the table 1 below shows: 
Table 1: BLNS and South Africa’s market access to the EU for selected products 
Product  
Market access for BLNS  
to EU  
Market access for  
RSA to EU  
Relevant for  
Fresh, chilled,  
frozen de-
boned meat  
92% tariff preference for  
quota  
MFN duty, excluded from  
the TDCA  
Namibia,  
Botswana,  
Swaziland  
Sugar  Fixed quantity and price  
MFN duty, excluded from  
the TDCA  
Swaziland  
Grapes  
Quota of 900 tons p.a. and  
only seasonal market  
access.  
Free market access by  
2010.  
Namibia  
Textiles and  
garments  
Duty free market access if 
precondition of double 
transformation is fulfilled.  
Free market access by  
2003/2006 (depending on 
product). Double 
transformation is prerequisite.  
All BLNS countries  
 
Lamb  Quota of 600,000 tons p.a.  Quota of 600,000 tons applies 
now for southern  
Africa and has to be  
shared with South Africa  
Namibia  
Confectionery  
12.9% plus a  
supplementary sugar duty  
MFN duty, excluded from  
the TDCA  
Swaziland  
Sausages  
65% reduction of MFN  
duty for a quota of 500  
tons p.a.  
Free market access by  
2003. For other processed 
meat products: free market 
access by 2010.  
Namibia,  
Botswana,  
Swaziland  
Fresh and  
frozen fish  
Free market access. All  
materials used must be  
wholly obtained. Limited  
cumulation options with  
South Africa (Cotonou  
Agreement, Annex XIV to 
Protocol 1)  
15% tariff. Tariff  
concessions will only  
take effect once a  
fisheries agreement has  
been concluded.  
Namibia  
Canned tuna  
and tuna 
loins  
Annual quota of 8,000 and  
2,000 tons respectively.  
Tariff concessions will only 
take effect once a fisheries 
agreement has been 
concluded.  
Namibia  
Source: Meyn (2004). 
Table 1 above can be viewed as highlighting the comparative advantage for the various 
member states of SACU, which will therefore determine their classification of sensitive 
products. For example, Swaziland can be viewed as having a comparative advantage in sugar 
and sugar products as can be seen by the fact that the country export sugar to the EU and 
would potentially benefit from the reduction in tariff escalation for confectionary products 
which are sugar based. On the other hand Namibia can be seen as having a comparative 
advantage in grapes and lamb with all the BLNS states potentially being able to produce 
garments and textile products but hampered by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules of 
origin clause which cripple these industries in all these countries. 
Besides these product differences, Lesotho is also classified as an LCD and is therefore a 
beneficial to the Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative, thus this  country stand in the EPAs will 
be different from that of the other SACU member states. However, low exports of  Lesotho 
products to  the EU despite these arrangements is a sign of poor industry development in that 
country,  as noted by at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development  (UNCTAD) 
in 2001. This poor industry development and export capacity can also affect the speed of 
adjustment to policy changes.  
Trade agreements between the EU and ACP countries 
The European Commission (EC) and African states have a long history of trade agreements. 
Until 2007 the EU granted non-reciprocity trade preferences to ACP countries under the 
Cotonou Agreement which was the latest Agreement between the EU and these countries. The 
Cotonou Agreement followed from a previous agreement called the Lome Convention which 
came into effect in 1976 between EC and ACP countries and its various subsequent 
amendments. There have been other trade agreements between the EC and former African 
colonies like the Younde Convention of 1963 between EC and 18 African ex colonies and the 
Arusha convention of 1969 between the EC and the East African countries of Kenya, Uganda 
and Tanzania.  
The hallmark of all these trade agreements is their non-reciprocity and violation of the MFN 
clause of the WTO and as such they were only temporarily covered by a waiver which expired in 
December 2007 (Vollmer et al 2008). 
The EPAs then aim to integrate ACP countries into the global economy in cognizance of WTO 
trading rules and they include improvements in the business transactions, promote regional 
markets and good economic governance. As such, these EPAs have been seen as a way of 
promoting development and reducing poverty in ACP countries. However there has been a lot 
of arguments and conflicting stands about the potential benefits of these EPAs more specifically 
the concern by South Africa that that signing of the EPAs by members of the SACU will result in 
South African exports to the SACU member states losing out to EU imports by these state after 
the full applications of the EPAs, which is the direct effect of inter-regional import substitution 
effect and this may lead to welfare loss if South Africa does not liberalize as well and increase 
exports to the EU.  
The SACU 
The SACU began in 1969 and its members are Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and 
Swaziland. The aim of the SACU is to maintain free interchange of goods and services between 
member countries, provision of the application of a common external and excise tariff by the 
member states and the sharing of these tariff revenues according to a predetermined and 
agreed revenue sharing formula. 
These SACU receipts contribute a significant revenue income for Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland 
and Namibia and their potential erosion due to the signing of the EPAs will have significant 
consequences for these countries. 
 
Graph 1 below show the total government revenue of the different member states from the 
SACU receipts 
 
 
 
 
Source: Flatters and Stern (2005) 
 
 
As the figure above shows the weaker economies like Swaziland and Lesotho get a substantial 
share of their government revenue from the SACU receipts meaning that policies that have a 
potential to affect the SACU revenue are important for the economic development of these 
states. 
South Africa is the strongest economy of the SACU and also plays an important role at regional 
and global level. As part of the SACU it accounts for 69% of the total GDP of the SADC 
(Development Network Africa, 2007). It is also one of the founding countries of the New 
Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and plays a key role in the African Union (AU). 
The relationship between South Africa and EU is guided by the Trade Development Cooperation 
Agenda (TDCA). The TDCA is a framework of cooperation in economic development, trade and 
investments, science and technology with extensions to environment and climate change, 
macro-economic policy, peace and security, migration, transport, housing, education and 
training, Information Communication Technology (ICT) and social matters (Council of European 
Union, 2007). 
This paper will analyze the effect of full liberalization of the BNLS states excluding South 
Africa(experiment 1) and compare the scenario with that where South Africa joins the BNLS 
states and signs the full EPA agreement with the EU (experiment 2). 
The aim is to find out the EPAs effects between the SACU member states and the EU and within 
the SACU member states in terms of welfare effects, commodity prices, trade volumes and 
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Graph 1:SACU receipts as a percentage of total 
government revenue
trade balance. Excluding South Africa in the initial experiment is to find out if the ‘Kenya effect’ 
applies to the SACU as well.  
The GTAP Model  
The model used in this paper is the Standard GTAP model which is a Computable General 
Equilibrium (CGE) model for comparative static analysis developed by Hertel in 1997. 
The GTAP model is a widely used, static, multisector, multiregion applied general equilibrium 
model. It is based on a detailed database with a broad coverage of trade and explicit statistics 
on transport margins. Firms use constant-returns-to-scale technologies, except for the resource 
supply sectors with an upward-sloping supply function, where a fixed factor is included in the 
production technology to construct a diminishing-returns-to-scale technology. Import demand 
is modeled through the Armington assumption of imperfect substitutability between domestic 
and imported goods and between imported goods from different regions. The model assumes a 
global bank to mediate between world savings and investments, and a region-specific set of 
equations for consumer demand that allows for different responses to price and income 
changes across regions (Kuik, 2003) 
Details on the theory behind the GTAP Model can be found in Hertel (1997). 
Data and Methodology 
To simulate the effects of the EPAs we use the GTAP model version 7. The standard GTAP 7 
Data Base consists of 57 commodities and 113 regions. The 113 regions are defined as 
aggregates of 226 countries using the GTAP standard country list. The Alpha-3 codes defined by 
the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) are used as country codes for the GTAP 
primary regions.  
In the sectoral definitions used in the GTAP 7 Data Base GTAP agricultural and food processing 
sectors are defined by reference to the Central Product Classification (CPC) and the other GTAP 
sectors are defined by reference to the International Standard Industry Classification (ISIC) since 
this is the reference classification point for I-O statistics tables where the GTAP data is sourced. 
The CPC was developed by the Statistical Office of the United Nations and serves as a bridge 
between the ISIC and other sectoral classifications (Narayanan et al 2008). 
The aggregation of the data base for the study used the complete GTAPAgg software licensed 
to the author.  
Simulation experiments were done using RunGTAP, which is a graphical user environment 
developed by Mark Horridge of the Centre of Policy Studies at Monash University. 
For the study the regions are aggregated in the following manner: 
South Africa 
EU27- Aggregation of the 27 EU member states 
Rest of SACU (RoSACU) – this region comprised Swaziland, Lesotho, Namibia and Botswana 
Rest of SADC (RoSADC) – this region comprise the rest of the SADC countries, namely Malawi, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Madagascar. 
Rest of the World (ROW) - all the other regions 
Commodities are aggregated by the default GTAP 7 database and these are aggregated into the 
following groups: 
Grain Crops, Livestock and Meat Products, Mining and Extraction, Processed Food, Textile and 
Clothing, Light Manufacturing, Heavy Manufacturing, Utilities and Construction, Transport and 
Communication and Other Services. 
Factors of production are also the default GTAP7 database and these are divided into the 
following; Land, Unskilled Labor, Skilled Labor, Capital and Natural Resources. 
 To model the effects of the EU27 EPAs with the SACU region two experiments are run whereby 
the SACU region is divided into the South Africa, which is the strongest economy of the customs 
union and the Rest of SACU comprising the rest of the members of the customs union.  
Experiments 
Experiment 1: Full reciprocal liberalization of Rest of SACU and EU27 but not South Africa 
In this experiment, Swaziland, Botswana, Namibia and Lesotho1 sign the EPA with the EU and it 
is assumed that they take the extreme case of 100% reciprocal trade liberalization with the 
EU27 on all products. This experiment is the extreme case since it does not classify the products 
into sensitive products that need to be protected and not liberalized and it takes the clause 
substantial liberalization as full liberalization but it is useful in shedding some light on the 
possible effects of the EPAs on the SACU member states as an upper bound scenario. 
 
 
                                                            
1 Lesotho is classified as a least developed country and is therefore a beneficially of the EBA protocol with the EU. 
However for this study, Lesotho is treated the same as the rest of the SACU member states.  
 
Experiment 2: Full reciprocal liberalization of the Rest of South Africa, EU27 and South Africa 
This experiment is an equivalent of the full reciprocal EPA agreement between South Africa, 
EU27 and the Rest of the SACU region.  
This again is the extreme case and simulates full EPA without consideration of sensitive 
products in all the regions.  
Closures 
The standard GTAP closure is used for these simulations where prices and quantities of all 
endowment commodities and regional incomes are set to be endogenous. Policy variables, 
technical change variables and population are all exogenous in the model. To comply with 
Walras’ Law, the equation equating global investment to global savings is eliminated. Therefore 
following Walras’ Law the numeraire price is pfactwld which is the world price index of primary 
factors and walraslack (a slack variable in the omitted equation) =0 
The following outcome variables are analyzed after the experiments. 
Equivalent variation 
Market price of commodity i in region r 
Market price of composite imports i in region r 
World price of composite import i in region r 
Domestic price for good i supplied from r to region s 
Industry output of commodity i in region r 
Export sale of commodity i from region r to region s. 
Change in trade balance of i by r: $ US Million 
Results and Discussion 
Results of the experiments are shown in Tables 2 to 17 in the appendix. 
The results of equivalent variation, which measures welfare are summarised in graph 2 below 
and show that full reciprocal trade liberalization between the EU and the Rest of SACU region 
excluding South Africa result in welfare loss of US $2.918 Million for South Africa and a welfare 
gain of US$ 409.108 million and US$114.649 million for the EU27 and Rest of SACU region 
respectively. There is also a welfare loss of US$4.376 million for the Rest of the SADC region 
which did not liberalized their markets and a welfare gain of US$43.98 million for the Rest of 
the World.  
On the contrary, full reciprocal liberalization of the entire SACU region including South Africa 
result in a welfare gain of US$ 164.93 Million for South Africa, US$1178.04 million for EU27 and 
US$105.61 for the rest of the SACU region while there is welfare loss for the rest of SADC and 
the Rest of the World. 
 
These results mean that liberalisations of SACU as a regional bloc will benefit the region and 
that the concern of South Africa that accession to the EPAs of the other SACU member states 
will harm South African economy is reasonable. Although the welfare loss is modest, the 
welfare gain from full EPAs of all the SACU member states is significant. 
Market prices of commodities in general go up in the Rest of SACU region after the EPA with 
EU27. The price of land goes up by as much as 48.52% in the Rest of SACU region, which is 
significant. Prices of natural resources go down in the Rest of SACU region in both experiments 
while it goes down slightly for South Africa after experiment 1 and goes up again after 
experiment 2. Prices of commodities in South Africa generally follow similar trend before and 
after South African EPA. The price of land goes up by 1.4% before South African EPA and by 
5.12% after South African EPA with the EU27 and Rest of SACU. 
Prices of commodities in the EU27 generally stay constant after the two experiments. Prices of 
imports in all the regions under focus i.e. EU27, Rest of SACU and South Africa stay the same for 
SouthAfrica EU27 RoSACU RoSADC ROW
Experiment 1 -2.918 490.108 114.649 -4.376 43.98
Experiment 2 164.93 1178.04 105.61 -7.45 -418.65
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Graph 2: Welfare effects of a SACU EPA without and with South Africa
the two experiments. However, South African signing of EPA together with the Rest of SACU 
region i.e. experiment 2 results in price decrease for imports of light manufacturing. 
World prices of composite imports in all regions generally stay the same in all the regions after 
the two experiments. Percentage changes of less that 1% are taken to be not significant for the 
purposes of this discussion. 
World prices of composite imports generally stay flat in all regions for both experiments. Prices 
of imports from EU27 to Rest of SACU generally go down for the Rest of SACU region after 
experiment 1 while they stay flat for South Africa. This fall in prices of imported commodities 
could be the reason for the welfare gain in the Rest of SACU region after experiment 1. Prices 
for goods supplied from South Africa to Rest of SACU stay flat generally after experiment 1. 
Industry output of commodities in all the focus regions generally stay flat or go down for 
commodities like textile, light and heavy manufacturing after experiment in the Rest of SACU 
region meaning a displacement of these industries outputs in this region by EU27 imports. 
However, of note is the meat and livestock industries and processed food industries which 
experience a gain in output of 36.19% and 21.2% respectively for the Rest of SACU region after 
experiment 1, meaning that these industry output experience high trade barriers into the EU27 
markets.  These industries experience similar output growth after experiment 2 as well. 
However, light manufacturing, textile industries and heavy manufacturing shrink after 
experiment 2 in all the regions of SACU, more significantly in the Rest of SACU region, meaning 
a lack of competitiveness in these industries. 
Export sale of commodities from EU27 to Rest of SACU and from South Africa to Rest of SACU 
increase but the increase in export sale from EU27 to Rest of SACU is higher than that from 
South Africa to Rest of SACU which means that South African products are not price 
competitive with those from EU27. 
The Rest of SACU region in both experiments remain a net importer of commodities from both 
the EU27 and from South Africa in both experiments except for two commodities output which 
are the livestock industry and the processed food industry in which case the Rest of the SACU 
region experience a massive increase in exports to the EU27 in both experiments of more that 
100% for processed food and more that 200% for livestock industries. These export growth are 
also supported by the increase in industry output in these sectors, meaning that EPAs 
agreements between the EU and Rest of SACU will result in significant increase in these two 
sectors. 
The meat and livestock and food processing industries in the Rest of SACU region experience an 
increase in trade balance of US$278.75 Million and US$386.93 Million respectively after 
experiment 1 and US$281.06 Million and US$379.01 Million after experiment 2. Indeed the 
EU27 experience a negative trade balance in these commodities of comparable magnitude to 
the trade balance gains in the Rest of the SACU region.  
Export sale of commodities from South Africa to Rest of SACU follow similar trends in both 
experiments in that South African export to this region increase in both cases. This is according 
to intuition as these states are members of a customs union and already function as a free 
trade area. Of note is the increase in exports from South Africa to EU27 after a South African 
EPA with the EU27, which could account for the welfare gain noted for South Africa except for 
the textile industry, light and heavy manufacturing which experience a huge negative trade 
balance after experiment 2, which means that these industries are not competitive in South 
Africa. 
The results have therefore shown that the EPAs in the SACU region will benefit mainly the 
livestock and meat industries and food processing industries. It should be noted that even 
though there will be no quota or tariff barriers after EPAs, non tariff barriers like Sanitary and 
the PhytoSanitary (SPS) requirements are  expected to remain. As such, for these industries to 
benefit they should improve their standards and transparency in the food production chain. For 
this reason programs like food safety standards and disease control programs especially of 
transboundary livestock disease like Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD), Avian Influenza (AI) and 
other zoonotics with potential to be pandemics should be better tackled at regional level to 
reduce costs and improve international trade and regional integration.  
 
Conclusion 
The paper has shown the usefulness of the GTAP in analysis regional and international trade 
policies. The study has shown that in the SACU region, the stronger economy i.e. South Africa 
stand to lose out if the other member states, i.e. Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho and Swaziland 
sign the EPA with the EU without South Africa as shown by the welfare loss. However, if they 
sign the EPAs as a regional bloc, the region stand to gain, as shown by a general welfare gain. 
Industries that stand to benefit the most are the livestock and meat industries and the food 
processing industries.  
Industries that are likely to lose out from EU27 exports are the light and heavy manufacturing 
industries. It is important that for the region to fully benefit from EPA with the EU27, the 
member states should cooperate with each other especially in terms of food processing 
standards and livestock disease control programs since it is likely that non tariff barriers like the 
SPS requirements will become even more important in food industries development and trade.  
Negotiation of EPAs as regional blocs and developing industries that could potentially benefit all 
members of the region will reduce country heterogeneity in terms of their classification of 
sensitive products, harmonize trade, reduce costs and promote regional integration. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 2: Equivalent Variation (Experiment 1) 
EV US$    Million 
SouthAfrica -2.918 
EU27 490.108 
RoSACU 114.649 
RoSADC -4.376 
ROW 43.98 
 
Table 3: Market price of commodity i in region r (% change) [Experiment 1] 
 
pm[*EU27] pm[*SouthAfrica] pm[*RoSACU] pm[*RoSADC] pm[*ROW] 
Land -0.16 1.41 48.52 0.09 -0.02 
UnSkLab 0 0.03 2.5 0.01 0 
SkLab 0 0.03 1.79 -0.01 0 
Capital 0 0.03 1.9 0 0 
NatRes 0.08 -0.11 -13.85 0.03 0.04 
GrainsCrops -0.01 0.13 4.68 0.02 0 
MeatLstk -0.02 0.09 4.12 0.01 0 
Extraction 0.01 0.01 0.29 0.01 0.01 
ProcFood -0.01 0.05 1.65 0.01 0 
TextWapp 0 0.04 1.19 0.01 0 
LightMnfc 0 0.04 1.07 0.01 0 
HeavyMnfc 0 0.03 1.37 0.01 0 
Util_Cons 0 0.03 1.24 0.01 0 
TransComm 0 0.03 1.55 0.01 0 
OthServices 0 0.03 1.65 0 0 
CGDS 0 0.04 0.71 0.02 0 
 
Table 4: Market price of composite imports i in region r (% change) [Experiment 1] 
 
pim[*EU27] pim[*SouthAfrica] pim[*RoSACU] pim[*RoSADC] pim[*ROW] 
GrainsCrops 0 0.11 0.08 0.04 0 
MeatLstk -0.18 0.99 0.1 0.18 0 
Extraction 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 
ProcFood -0.1 0.3 -0.18 0.11 0 
TextWapp 0 0.13 -0.22 0.01 0 
LightMnfc 0 0.03 -0.9 0.02 0 
HeavyMnfc 0 0.06 -0.07 0.04 0 
Util_Cons 0 0 0.01 0 0 
TransComm 0 0 0 0 0 
OthServices 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Table 5: World price of composite imports i in region r (% change) [Experiment 1] 
 
piw[*EU27] piw[*SouthAfrica] piw[*RoSACU] piw[*RoSADC] piw[*ROW] 
GrainsCrops 0 0.11 0.1 0.03 0 
MeatLstk -0.01 1.06 0.15 0.18 0 
Extraction 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 
ProcFood 0 0.33 0.05 0.11 0 
TextWapp 0 0.16 0.02 0.01 0 
LightMnfc 0 0.04 0.03 0.02 0 
HeavyMnfc 0 0.06 0.03 0.04 0 
Util_Cons 0 0 0.01 0 0 
TransComm 0 0 0 0 0 
OthServices 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Table 6: Domestic price for good i supplied from region r to region s (% change) [Experiment 1] 
pms[*EU27*] SouthAfrica EU27 RoSACU RoSADC ROW 
GrainsCrops -0.01 -0.01 -3.81 -0.01 -0.01 
MeatLstk -0.02 -0.02 -5.08 -0.02 -0.02 
Extraction 0.01 0.01 0 0.01 0.01 
ProcFood -0.01 -0.01 -7.7 -0.01 -0.01 
TextWapp 0 0 -12.67 0 0 
LightMnfc 0 0 -11.89 0 0 
HeavyMnfc 0 0 -1.25 0 0 
Util_Cons 0 0 0 0 0 
TransComm 0 0 0 0 0 
OthServices 0 0 0 0 0 
pms[*SouthAfrica*] SouthAfrica EU27 RoSACU RoSADC ROW 
GrainsCrops 0.13 0.1 0.12 0.11 0.11 
MeatLstk 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 
Extraction 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
ProcFood 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
TextWapp 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
LightMnfc 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
HeavyMnfc 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Util_Cons 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
TransComm 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
OthServices 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
pms[*RoSACU*] SouthAfrica EU27 RoSACU RoSADC ROW 
GrainsCrops 4.03 3.12 4.07 4.13 4.07 
MeatLstk 3.92 -40.32 4.02 3.88 3.93 
Extraction 0.24 0.29 0.27 0.27 0.28 
ProcFood 1.52 -29.25 1.55 1.52 1.52 
TextWapp 1.12 0.91 1.12 1.11 1.13 
LightMnfc 1.02 1.04 1.03 0.99 1.02 
HeavyMnfc 1.31 1.31 1.31 1.31 1.34 
Util_Cons 1.24 1.24 1.24 1.24 1.24 
TransComm 1.55 1.55 1.55 1.55 1.55 
OthServices 1.65 1.65 1.65 1.65 1.65 
pms[*RoSADC*] SouthAfrica EU27 RoSACU RoSADC ROW 
GrainsCrops 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 
MeatLstk 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Extraction 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
ProcFood 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
TextWapp 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
LightMnfc 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
HeavyMnfc 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Util_Cons 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
TransComm 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
OthServices 0 0 0 0 0 
pms[*ROW*] SouthAfrica EU27 RoSACU RoSADC ROW 
GrainsCrops 0 0 0 0 0 
MeatLstk 0 0 0 0 0 
Extraction 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
ProcFood 0 0 0 0 0 
TextWapp 0 0 0 0 0 
LightMnfc 0 0 0 0 0 
HeavyMnfc 0 0 0 0 0 
Util_Cons 0 0 0 0 0 
TransComm 0 0 0 0 0 
OthServices 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Table 7: Industry output of commodity i in region r (% change) [Experiment 1] 
 
qo[*EU27] qo[*SouthAfrica] qo[*RoSACU] qo[*RoSADC] qo[*ROW] 
Land 0 0 0 0 0 
UnSkLab 0 0 0 0 0 
SkLab 0 0 0 0 0 
Capital 0 0 0 0 0 
NatRes 0 0 0 0 0 
GrainsCrops -0.01 0.41 1.41 0.02 0 
MeatLstk -0.19 0.36 36.19 0.03 -0.01 
Extraction 0.01 -0.02 -2.8 0 0.01 
ProcFood -0.05 0.21 21.2 0.01 -0.01 
TextWapp 0.01 -0.06 -7.44 -0.03 0.01 
LightMnfc 0.01 -0.15 -4.4 -0.02 0 
HeavyMnfc 0.01 -0.04 -7.26 0.01 0 
Util_Cons 0 -0.01 1.45 -0.02 0 
TransComm 0 0 -0.08 -0.01 0 
OthServices 0 0 -0.58 -0.01 0 
CGDS 0 -0.01 2.27 -0.03 0 
 
Table 8: Export Sales of commodity i from region r to region s (% change) [Experiment 1] 
qxs[*EU27*] SouthAfrica EU27 RoSACU RoSADC ROW 
GrainsCrops 0.79 0.01 36.15 0.2 0.05 
MeatLstk 4.7 -0.8 56.7 0.94 0.11 
Extraction 0 0.04 0.27 0.16 -0.01 
ProcFood 0.89 -0.23 38.83 0.32 0.03 
TextWapp 0.71 0.02 91.74 0.07 0.04 
LightMnfc 0.19 0.01 76.25 0.1 0.02 
HeavyMnfc 0.36 0.01 10.28 0.24 0.02 
Util_Cons 0.07 0 2.63 0.02 0.01 
TransComm 0.08 0.01 3.23 0.01 0.01 
OthServices 0.08 0.01 2.76 0.01 0.01 
qxs[*SouthAfrica*] SouthAfrica EU27 RoSACU RoSADC ROW 
GrainsCrops 0.06 -0.56 16.33 -0.44 -0.55 
MeatLstk 3.91 -1.57 19.52 0.2 -0.65 
Extraction -0.05 0 0.07 0.15 -0.04 
ProcFood 0.63 -0.47 5.47 0.09 -0.2 
TextWapp 0.38 -0.31 -3.05 -0.24 -0.28 
LightMnfc -0.06 -0.23 -2.76 -0.13 -0.22 
HeavyMnfc 0.09 -0.24 0.7 0 -0.23 
Util_Cons -0.09 -0.16 2.47 -0.14 -0.15 
TransComm -0.07 -0.14 3.09 -0.13 -0.13 
OthServices -0.06 -0.13 2.63 -0.13 -0.13 
qxs[*RoSACU*] SouthAfrica EU27 RoSACU RoSADC ROW 
GrainsCrops -19.62 -15.81 -3.64 -20.72 -20.57 
MeatLstk -23.62 288.81 -8.76 -27.06 -28.29 
Extraction -2.72 -3.26 -2.92 -2.86 -3.24 
ProcFood -5.68 125.62 -0.97 -6.26 -6.56 
TextWapp -7.68 -6.78 -11.12 -8.22 -8.37 
LightMnfc -6.59 -6.88 -9.37 -6.47 -6.74 
HeavyMnfc -9.39 -9.73 -8.85 -9.52 -9.95 
Util_Cons -5.68 -5.74 -3.11 -5.73 -5.74 
TransComm -5.81 -5.88 -2.65 -5.87 -5.87 
OthServices -6.2 -6.27 -3.52 -6.27 -6.27 
qxs[*RoSADC*] SouthAfrica EU27 RoSACU RoSADC ROW 
GrainsCrops 0.65 -0.13 16.84 0.06 -0.09 
MeatLstk 4.47 -1.03 20.07 0.72 -0.12 
Extraction 0.02 0.05 0.12 0.18 0 
ProcFood 0.8 -0.31 5.63 0.24 -0.05 
TextWapp 0.63 -0.07 -2.81 -0.01 -0.04 
LightMnfc 0.11 -0.08 -2.59 0.02 -0.07 
HeavyMnfc 0.26 -0.08 0.87 0.15 -0.07 
Util_Cons 0.02 -0.05 2.58 -0.03 -0.04 
TransComm 0.04 -0.03 3.2 -0.02 -0.02 
OthServices 0.05 -0.02 2.74 -0.01 -0.01 
qxs[*ROW*] SouthAfrica EU27 RoSACU RoSADC ROW 
GrainsCrops 0.74 -0.04 16.93 0.15 0 
MeatLstk 4.59 -0.92 20.18 0.83 -0.01 
Extraction 0.02 0.05 0.12 0.17 0 
ProcFood 0.86 -0.26 5.68 0.29 0 
TextWapp 0.69 -0.01 -2.75 0.05 0.02 
LightMnfc 0.17 -0.01 -2.53 0.08 0 
HeavyMnfc 0.33 -0.01 0.93 0.22 0 
Util_Cons 0.06 -0.01 2.62 0.01 0 
TransComm 0.06 -0.01 3.22 0 0 
OthServices 0.06 0 2.75 0 0 
 
Table 9: Change in trade balance by i and by r ($US Million) [Experiment 1] 
 
DTBALi[*EU27] DTBALi[*SouthAfrica] DTBALi[*RoSACU] DTBALi[*RoSADC] DTBALi[*ROW] 
GrainsCrops 37.3 26.7 -65.59 2.13 1.57 
MeatLstk -243.73 25.06 278.75 0.6 -68.7 
Extraction -21.02 1.99 -116.26 0.57 130.41 
ProcFood -361.29 41.1 386.93 0.06 -89.53 
TextWapp 41.26 -3.59 -77.77 -0.54 43.34 
LightMnfc 196.72 -56.95 -101.04 -0.21 -37.55 
HeavyMnfc 277.02 -18.14 -234.18 -0.75 -22.23 
Util_Cons 4.6 0.18 -4.3 0.11 -0.6 
TransComm 53.02 -6.53 -30.3 -0.3 11.67 
OthServices 64.32 -4.84 -70.33 -0.07 10.93 
 
 Table 10: Equivalent variation ($ US million) [Experiment 2] 
EV 
 SouthAfrica 164.93 
EU27 1178.04 
RoSACU 105.61 
RoSADC -7.45 
ROW -418.65 
Table 11: Market Price of Commodity i in Region r [Experiment 2] 
 
SouthAfrica EU27 RoSACU RoSADC ROW 
Land 5.12 -0.28 49.01 0.21 -0.03 
UnSkLab 0.28 0.02 1.96 -0.06 -0.01 
SkLab 0.29 0.02 1.39 -0.07 -0.01 
Capital 0.3 0.02 1.56 -0.08 -0.01 
NatRes 0.91 -0.04 -11.06 0.27 0.06 
GrainsCrops 0.34 0 4.41 -0.03 -0.01 
MeatLstk 0.14 -0.01 3.82 -0.04 -0.01 
Extraction 0.11 0.01 0.23 -0.01 0 
ProcFood 0.02 0.01 1.36 -0.04 -0.01 
TextWapp -0.07 0.01 0.9 -0.05 -0.01 
LightMnfc -0.59 0.02 0.72 -0.06 -0.01 
HeavyMnfc -0.05 0.01 1.05 -0.05 -0.01 
Util_Cons -0.01 0.02 0.91 -0.05 -0.01 
TransComm 0.02 0.02 1.2 -0.06 -0.01 
OthServices 0.07 0.02 1.28 -0.06 -0.01 
CGDS -0.59 0.01 0.42 -0.05 -0.01 
 
 
 
Table 12: Market price of composite import i in region r (% change) [Experiment 2] 
pim SouthAfrica EU27 RoSACU RoSADC ROW 
GrainsCrops -0.13 -0.02 0.17 0.06 -0.01 
MeatLstk 0.28 -0.2 0.14 0.18 -0.01 
Extraction 0 0.01 0.05 0.03 0 
ProcFood -2.23 -0.16 -0.21 0.08 0 
TextWapp -1.18 0 -0.28 -0.01 0 
LightMnfc -5.41 0 -1.39 -0.15 0 
HeavyMnfc -0.69 0.01 -0.13 0 0 
Util_Cons 0 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0 
TransComm 0 0 0 0 0 
OthServices 0 0.01 0.01 0 0 
 
Table 13: World price of composite import i in region r (% change) [Experiment 2] 
piw SouthAfrica EU27 RoSACU RoSADC ROW 
GrainsCrops 0.1 0 0.25 0.06 -0.01 
MeatLstk 0.98 0 0.19 0.17 -0.01 
Extraction 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.03 0 
ProcFood 0.27 0.01 0.02 0.08 0 
TextWapp 0.11 0 -0.04 -0.01 0 
LightMnfc 0.03 0.01 -0.46 -0.15 0 
HeavyMnfc 0.05 0.01 -0.04 0 0 
Util_Cons 0 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0 
TransComm 0 0 0 0 0 
OthServices 0 0.01 0.01 0 0 
Table 14: Domestic price for good i supplied from r to region s [Experiment 2] 
pms[*EU27*] SouthAfrica EU27 RoSACU RoSADC ROW 
GrainsCrops -4.11 0 -3.8 0 0 
MeatLstk -5.14 -0.01 -5.07 -0.01 -0.01 
Extraction -0.04 0.01 0 0.01 0.01 
ProcFood -10.25 0.01 -7.69 0.01 0.01 
TextWapp -10.5 0.01 -12.66 0.01 0.01 
LightMnfc -10.47 0.01 -11.87 0.01 0.01 
HeavyMnfc -1.55 0.01 -1.24 0.01 0.01 
Util_Cons 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
TransComm 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
OthServices 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
pms[*SouthAfrica*] SouthAfrica EU27 RoSACU RoSADC ROW 
GrainsCrops 0.34 -0.79 0.22 0.29 0.27 
MeatLstk 0.14 -4.77 0.14 0.13 0.13 
Extraction 0.11 -0.06 0.1 0.09 0.1 
ProcFood 0.02 -10.7 0.01 0.01 0.01 
TextWapp -0.07 -0.74 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 
LightMnfc -0.59 -2.19 -0.58 -0.54 -0.56 
HeavyMnfc -0.05 -0.22 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 
Util_Cons -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
TransComm 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
OthServices 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
pms[*RoSACU*] SouthAfrica EU27 RoSACU RoSADC ROW 
GrainsCrops 3.8 2.91 3.84 3.9 3.84 
MeatLstk 3.64 -40.6 3.73 3.6 3.65 
Extraction 0.19 0.23 0.21 0.21 0.22 
ProcFood 1.25 -29.52 1.27 1.25 1.25 
TextWapp 0.85 0.63 0.85 0.84 0.85 
LightMnfc 0.69 0.7 0.7 0.67 0.69 
HeavyMnfc 1 0.99 1.01 1 1.02 
Util_Cons 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 
TransComm 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 
OthServices 1.28 1.28 1.28 1.28 1.28 
pms[*RoSADC*] SouthAfrica EU27 RoSACU RoSADC ROW 
GrainsCrops -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
MeatLstk -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
Extraction -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
ProcFood -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
TextWapp -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
LightMnfc -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 
HeavyMnfc -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
Util_Cons -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 
TransComm -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 
OthServices -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 
pms[*ROW*] SouthAfrica EU27 RoSACU RoSADC ROW 
GrainsCrops -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
MeatLstk -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Extraction 0 0 0 0 0 
ProcFood -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
TextWapp -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
LightMnfc -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
HeavyMnfc -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Util_Cons -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
TransComm -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
OthServices -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 Table 15: Industry output of commodity i in region r (% change) [Experiment 2] 
qo SouthAfrica EU27 RoSACU RoSADC ROW 
Land 0 0 0 0 0 
UnSkLab 0 0 0 0 0 
SkLab 0 0 0 0 0 
Capital 0 0 0 0 0 
NatRes 0 0 0 0 0 
GrainsCrops 1.46 -0.05 1.67 0.07 0 
MeatLstk 1.19 -0.22 36.5 0.02 -0.01 
Extraction 0.09 -0.01 -2.24 0.05 0.01 
ProcFood 1.95 -0.08 20.76 0 -0.01 
TextWapp -0.79 0.02 -7.11 0.08 0.01 
LightMnfc -2.25 0.09 -9.08 -1.19 -0.03 
HeavyMnfc -0.15 -0.01 -6.81 0.1 0.01 
Util_Cons 1.49 0 1.44 -0.01 -0.01 
TransComm -0.09 0 -0.22 0.03 0 
OthServices 0.01 0 -0.44 0.02 0 
CGDS 2.75 0 2.16 -0.07 -0.02 
Table 16: Export sale of commodity i from r to s (% change) [Experiment 2] 
qxs[*EU27*] SouthAfrica EU27 RoSACU RoSADC ROW 
GrainsCrops 21.95 -0.09 35.76 0.13 -0.04 
MeatLstk 38.8 -0.93 55.94 0.65 -0.03 
Extraction 0.54 -0.03 0.21 0.14 -0.04 
ProcFood 39.3 -0.41 38.11 0.09 -0.06 
TextWapp 72.16 -0.05 90.76 -0.22 -0.14 
LightMnfc 45.08 -0.03 72.27 -1.05 -0.15 
HeavyMnfc 8.6 -0.04 9.15 -0.18 -0.13 
Util_Cons 0.12 -0.02 1.9 -0.22 -0.1 
TransComm 0 -0.02 2.51 -0.17 -0.08 
OthServices 0.1 -0.02 2.07 -0.18 -0.09 
qxs[*SouthAfrica*] SouthAfrica EU27 RoSACU RoSADC ROW 
GrainsCrops -0.49 3.87 15.44 -1.37 -1.43 
MeatLstk 0.85 33.32 18.51 -0.33 -1.03 
Extraction -1.3 0.8 -1.03 -0.76 -1.09 
ProcFood -4.88 45.65 4.96 0.05 -0.09 
TextWapp -5.56 5.56 -3.09 0.38 0.48 
LightMnfc -20.42 14.6 -2.54 2.59 3.64 
HeavyMnfc -2.59 1.67 0.29 0.28 0.33 
Util_Cons 0.25 0.11 2.03 -0.09 0.03 
TransComm -0.01 -0.03 2.5 -0.18 -0.09 
OthServices -0.08 -0.2 1.89 -0.36 -0.27 
qxs[*RoSACU*] SouthAfrica EU27 RoSACU RoSADC ROW 
GrainsCrops -17.96 -14.81 -2.82 -19.56 -19.44 
MeatLstk -24.28 290.81 -7.33 -25.24 -26.29 
Extraction -2.22 -2.62 -2.3 -2.23 -2.57 
ProcFood -10.19 126.66 -0.45 -5.28 -5.42 
TextWapp -12.43 -4.63 -9.93 -6.37 -6.38 
LightMnfc -28.85 -4.57 -11.02 -5.38 -4.61 
HeavyMnfc -10.41 -7.31 -7.56 -7.53 -7.65 
Util_Cons -4.03 -4.17 -2.25 -4.37 -4.25 
TransComm -4.5 -4.52 -1.99 -4.67 -4.58 
OthServices -4.7 -4.82 -2.73 -4.98 -4.88 
qxs[*RoSADC*] SouthAfrica EU27 RoSACU RoSADC ROW 
GrainsCrops 1.32 0 16.68 0.22 0.06 
MeatLstk 2.13 -0.71 19.74 0.87 0.19 
Extraction 0.17 0.21 0.31 0.37 0.21 
ProcFood -4.66 -0.23 5.17 0.26 0.13 
TextWapp -5.79 0.38 -3.29 0.19 0.28 
LightMnfc -23.96 0.42 -6.07 -0.62 0.3 
HeavyMnfc -2.64 0.4 0.21 0.24 0.3 
Util_Cons 0.44 0.3 2.22 0.1 0.22 
TransComm 0.29 0.27 2.8 0.12 0.21 
OthServices 0.42 0.3 2.39 0.14 0.23 
qxs[*ROW*] SouthAfrica EU27 RoSACU RoSADC ROW 
GrainsCrops 1.26 -0.05 16.63 0.16 0 
MeatLstk 1.95 -0.89 19.58 0.69 0.01 
Extraction -0.02 0.02 0.13 0.2 0.02 
ProcFood -4.78 -0.34 5.06 0.15 0.01 
TextWapp -6.04 0.12 -3.54 -0.06 0.03 
LightMnfc -24.25 0.12 -6.34 -0.9 0 
HeavyMnfc -2.92 0.12 -0.02 -0.02 0.02 
Util_Cons 0.24 0.1 2.02 -0.1 0.02 
TransComm 0.1 0.08 2.61 -0.07 0.02 
OthServices 0.22 0.1 2.19 -0.06 0.03 
 
Table 17: Change in  trade balance by i and by r ($ US Million) [Experiment 2] 
DTBALi SouthAfrica EU27 RoSACU RoSADC ROW 
GrainsCrops 63.26 -31.69 -62.68 6.63 10.18 
MeatLstk 83.19 -312.45 281.06 0.9 -63.32 
Extraction 24.5 -30.38 -93.06 3.9 87.81 
ProcFood 392.04 -686.41 379.01 -0.54 -142.4 
TextWapp -63.99 39.99 -74.45 1.98 89.13 
LightMnfc -1061.99 2084.76 -183.79 -28.08 -872.04 
HeavyMnfc -354.99 -624.06 -202.22 10.92 1137.32 
Util_Cons -0.12 -26.76 -3.27 1.51 28.64 
TransComm -3.87 -103.72 -23.65 4.85 318.39 
OthServices -10.05 -283.34 -54.32 3.34 344.37 
 
 
